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Abstract
Learning-based pattern classifiers, including deep networks, have shown impressive performance in several application domains,
ranging from computer vision to cybersecurity. However, it has also been shown that adversarial input perturbations carefully
crafted either at training or at test time can easily subvert their predictions. The vulnerability of machine learning to such wild
patterns (also referred to as adversarial examples), along with the design of suitable countermeasures, have been investigated in
the research field of adversarial machine learning. In this work, we provide a thorough overview of the evolution of this research
area over the last ten years and beyond, starting from pioneering, earlier work on the security of non-deep learning algorithms up
to more recent work aimed to understand the security properties of deep learning algorithms, in the context of computer vision
and cybersecurity tasks. We report interesting connections between these apparently-different lines of work, highlighting common
misconceptions related to the security evaluation of machine-learning algorithms. We review the main threat models and attacks
defined to this end, and discuss the main limitations of current work, along with the corresponding future challenges towards the
design of more secure learning algorithms.
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1. Introduction
Modern technologies based on pattern recognition, machine
learning and data-driven artificial intelligence, especially after
the advent of deep learning, have reported impressive perfor-
mance in a variety of application domains, from classical pat-
tern recognition tasks like speech and object recognition, used
by self-driving cars and robots, to more modern cybersecurity
tasks like spam and malware detection [1].1 It has been thus
surprising to see that such technologies can easily be fooled
by adversarial examples, i.e., carefully-perturbed input sam-
ples aimed to mislead detection at test time. This has brought
considerable attention since 2014, when Szegedy et al. [2] and
subsequent work [3–5] showed that deep networks for object
recognition can be fooled by input images perturbed in an im-
perceptible manner.
Since then, an ever-increasing number of research papers
have started proposing countermeasures to mitigate the threat
associated to these wild patterns, not only in the area of com-
puter vision [6–12].2 This huge and growing body of work has
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: battista.biggio@diee.unica.it (Battista
Biggio), roli@diee.unica.it (Fabio Roli)
1The term malware (short for malicious software) is normally used to refer
to harmful computer programs in general, including computer viruses, worms,
ransomware, spyware, etc.
2More than 150 papers on this subject were published on ArXiv only in the
last two years.
clearly fueled a renewed interest in the research field known as
adversarial machine learning, while also raising a number of
misconceptions on how the security properties of learning al-
gorithms should be evaluated and understood.
The primary misconception is about the start date of the
field of adversarial machine learning, which is not 2014.
This wrong start date is implicitly acknowledged in a grow-
ing number of recent papers in the area of computer secu-
rity [6, 8, 11, 13–17] and computer vision [9, 10, 18], which
focus mainly on the study of security and robustness of deep
networks to adversarial inputs. However, as we will discuss
throughout this manuscript, this research area has been inde-
pendently developing and re-discovering well-known phenom-
ena that had been largely explored in the field of adversarial
machine learning before the discovery of adversarial examples
against deep networks.
To the best of our knowledge, the very first, seminal work
in the area of adversarial machine learning dates back to 2004.
At that time, Dalvi et al. [19], and immediately later Lowd and
Meek [20, 21] studied the problem in the context of spam fil-
tering, showing that linear classifiers could be easily tricked by
few carefully-crafted changes in the content of spam emails,
without significantly affecting the readability of the spam mes-
sage. These were indeed the first adversarial examples against
linear classifiers for spam filtering. Even earlier, Matsumoto et
al. [22] showed that fake fingerprints can be fabricated with
plastic-like materials to mislead biometric identity recognition
systems. In 2006, in their famous paper, Barreno et al. [23]
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questioned the suitability of machine learning in adversarial set-
tings from a broader perspective, categorizing attacks against
machine-learning algorithms both at training and at test time,
and envisioning potential countermeasures to mitigate such
threats. Since then, and independently from the discovery of
adversarial examples against deep networks [2], a large amount
of work has been done to: (i) develop attacks against ma-
chine learning, both at training time (poisoning) [24–33] and at
test time (evasion) [19–21, 30, 34–39]; (ii) propose systematic
methodologies for security evaluation of learning algorithms
against such attacks [39–43]; and (iii) design suitable defense
mechanisms to mitigate these threats [12, 19, 35, 44–48].
The fact that adversarial machine learning was well-
established before 2014 is also witnessed by a number of related
events, including the 2007 NIPS Workshop on Machine Learn-
ing in Adversarial Environments for Computer Security [49],
along with the subsequent special issue on the journal Machine
Learning [50], the 2013 Dagstuhl Perspectives Workshop on
Machine Learning Methods for Computer Security [51] and,
most importantly, the Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and
Security (AISec), which reached its 10th edition in 2017 [52].
Worth remarking, a book has also been recently published on
this subject [53].
In this work, we aim to provide a thorough overview of the
evolution of this interdisciplinary research area over the last
ten years and beyond, from pioneering work on the security
of (non-deep) learning algorithms to more recent work focused
on the security properties of deep learning algorithms, in the
context of computer vision and cybersecurity tasks. Our goal is
to connect the dots between these apparently-different lines of
work, while also highlighting common misconceptions related
to the security evaluation of learning algorithms.
We first review the notion of arms race in computer secu-
rity, advocating for a proactive security-by-design cycle that
explicitly accounts for the presence of the attacker in the loop
(Sect. 2). Our narrative of the security of machine learning then
follows three metaphors, referred to as the three golden rules in
the following: (i) know your adversary, (ii) be proactive; and
(iii) protect yourself. Knowing the attacker amounts to model-
ing threats against the learning-based system under design. To
this end, we review a comprehensive threat model which al-
lows one to envision and simulate attacks against the system
under design, to thoroughly assess its security properties under
well-defined attack scenarios (Sect. 3). We then discuss how
to proactively simulate test-time evasion and training-time poi-
soning attacks against the system under design (Sect. 4), and
how to protect it with different defense mechanisms (Sect. 5).
We finally discuss the main limitations of current work and the
future research challenges towards the design of more secure
learning algorithms (Sect. 6).
2. Arms Race and Security by Design
Security is an arms race, and the security of machine learn-
ing and pattern recognition systems is not an exception to
this [41, 42, 54]. To better understand this phenomenon, con-
sider that, since the 90s, computer viruses and Internet scams
have increased not only in terms of absolute numbers, but also
in terms of variability and sophistication, in response to the
growing complexity of defense systems. Automatic tools for
designing novel variants of attacks have been developed, mak-
ing large-scale automatization of stealthier attacks practical also
for non-skilled attackers. A very clear example of this is pro-
vided by phishing kits, which automatically compromise legiti-
mate (vulnerable) websites in the wild, and hide phishing web-
pages within them [55, 56]. The sophistication and proliferation
of such attack vectors, malware and other threats, is strongly
motivated by a flourishing underground economy, which en-
ables easy monetization after attack. To tackle the increas-
ing complexity of modern attacks, and favor the detection of
never-before-seen ones, machine learning and pattern recogni-
tion techniques have been widely adopted over the last decade
also in a variety of cybersecurity application domains. How-
ever, as we will see throughout this paper, machine learning and
pattern recognition techniques turned out not to be the definitive
answer to such threats. They introduce specific vulnerabilities
that skilled attackers can exploit to compromise the whole sys-
tem, i.e., machine learning itself can be the weakest link in the
security chain.
To further clarify how the aforementioned arms race typi-
cally evolves, along with the notions of reactive and proactive
security, we briefly summarize in the following an exemplary
case in spam filtering.
The spam arms race. Spam emails typically convey the spam
message in textual format, which can be detected by rule-based
filters and text classifiers. Spammers attempt to mislead these
defenses by obfuscating the content of spam emails to evade
detection, e.g., by misspelling bad words (i.e., words likely to
appear in spam but not in legitimate emails), and adding good
words (i.e., words typically occurring in legitimate emails, ran-
domly guessed from a reference vocabulary) [21, 34, 44]. In
2005, spammers invented a new trick to evade textual-based
analysis, referred to as image-based spam (or image spam, for
short) [57, 58]. The idea is simply to embed the spam message
within an attached image (Fig. 2, left). Due to the large amount
of image spam sent in 2006 and 2007, countermeasures were
promptly developed based on signatures of known spam im-
ages (through hashing), and on extracting text from suspect im-
ages with OCR tools [59]. To evade these defenses, spammers
started obfuscating images with random noise patterns (Fig. 2,
right) that, ironically, were similar to those used in CAPTCHAs
to protect web sites from spam bots [60]. Learning-based ap-
proaches based on low-level visual features were then devised
to detect spam images. Image spam volumes have since de-
clined, but spammers have been constantly developing novel
tricks to evade detection.
Reactive and proactive security. As discussed for spam fil-
tering, security problems are often cast as a reactive arms race,
in which the system designer and the attacker aim to achieve
their goals by adapting their behavior in response to that of
the opponent, i.e., learning from the past. This can be mod-
eled according to the following steps (Fig. 1, left) [41, 42]: (i)
the attacker analyzes the defense system and crafts an attack
to violate its security; and (ii) the system designer analyzes
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Adversary Designer 
1. Analyze system 
2. Devise attack 3. Analyze attack 
4. Develop countermeasure 
(e.g., add features, retraining) 
Designer 
1. Model adversary 
2. Simulate attack 3. Evaluate attack’s impact 
4. Develop countermeasure 
(if the attack has a relevant impact) 
Designer 
Figure 1: A conceptual representation of the reactive (left) and proactive (right) arms races for pattern recognition and machine learning systems in computer
security [41, 42].
Figure 2: Examples of clean (top) and obfuscated (bottom) spam images [57].
the newly-deployed attacks and designs novel countermeasures
against them. However, reactive approaches are clearly not able
to prevent the risk of never-before-seen attacks. To this end,
the designer should follow a proactive approach to anticipate
the attacker by (i) identifying relevant threats against the sys-
tem under design and simulating the corresponding attacks, (ii)
devising suitable countermeasures (if retained necessary), and
(iii) repeating this process before system deployment (Fig. 1,
right). In practice, these steps are facilitated by leveraging a
thorough model of the attacker, as that discussed in the next
section, which helps envisioning and analyzing a number of po-
tential attack scenarios against learning-based systems.
3. Know Your Adversary: Modeling Threats
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need
not fear the result of a hundred battles.” (Sun Tzu,
The Art of War, 500 BC)
We discuss here the first golden rule of the proactive secu-
rity cycle discussed in the previous section, i.e., how to model
threats against learning-based systems and thoroughly evalu-
ate their security against the corresponding attacks. To this
end, we exploit a framework based on the popular attack tax-
onomy proposed in [23, 40, 61] and subsequently extended
in [7, 30, 33, 41, 42], which enables one to envision different
attack scenarios against learning algorithms and deep networks,
and to implement the corresponding attack strategies. Notably,
these attacks include training-time poisoning and test-time eva-
sion attacks (also recently referred to as adversarial training and
test examples) [3–5, 14–16, 26, 29, 31–33, 38, 41, 61]. It con-
sists of defining the attacker’s goal, knowledge of the targeted
system, and capability of manipulating the input data, to sub-
sequently define an optimization problem corresponding to the
optimal attack strategy. The solution to this problem provides
a way to manipulate input data to achieve the attacker’s goal.
While this framework only considers attacks against supervised
learning algorithms, we refer the reader to similar threat mod-
els to evaluate the security of clustering [62–64], and feature
selection algorithms [29, 65] under different attack settings.
Notation. In the following, we denote the sample and label
spaces with X and Y, respectively, and the training data with
D = (xi, yi)ni=1, being n the number of training samples. We use
L(D,w) to denote the loss incurred by the classifier f : X 7→ Y
(parameterized by w) on D. We assume that the classifica-
tion function f is learned by minimizing an objective function
L(D,w) on the training data. Typically, this is an estimate of
the generalization error, obtained by the sum of the empirical
loss L onD and a regularization term.
3.1. Attacker’s Goal
This aspect is defined in terms of the desired security viola-
tion, attack specificity, and error specificity, as detailed below.
Security Violation. The attacker may aim to cause: an integrity
violation, to evade detection without compromising normal sys-
tem operation; an availability violation, to compromise the nor-
mal system functionalities available to legitimate users; or a pri-
vacy violation, to obtain private information about the system,
its users or data by reverse-engineering the learning algorithm.
Attack Specificity. It ranges from targeted to indiscriminate,
respectively, depending on whether the attacker aims to cause
misclassification of a specific set of samples (to target a given
system user or protected service), or of any sample (to target
any system user or protected service).
Error Specificity. It can be specific, if the attacker aims to
have a sample misclassified as a specific class; or generic, if
the attacker aims to have a sample misclassified as any of the
classes different from the true class.3
3In [14], the authors defined targeted and indiscriminate attacks (at test
time) depending on whether the attacker aims to cause specific or generic er-
rors. Here we do not follow their naming convention, as it can cause confusion
with the interpretation of targeted and indiscriminate attack specificity also in-
troduced in previous work [23, 29, 30, 40–42, 61–64].
3
3.2. Attacker’s Knowledge
The attacker can have different levels of knowledge of the
targeted system, including: (k.i) the training data D; (k.ii) the
feature set X; (k.iii) the learning algorithm f , along with the
objective function L minimized during training; and, possi-
bly, (k.iv) its (trained) parameters/hyper-parameters w. The
attacker’s knowledge can thus be characterized in terms of a
space Θ, whose elements encode the components (k.i)-(k.iv) as
θ = (D,X, f ,w). Depending on the assumptions made on (k.i)-
(k.iv), one can describe different attack scenarios.
Perfect-Knowledge (PK) White-Box Attacks. Here the at-
tacker is assumed to know everything about the targeted sys-
tem, i.e., θPK = (D,X, f ,w). This setting allows one to perform
a worst-case evaluation of the security of learning algorithms,
providing empirical upper bounds on the performance degrada-
tion that may be incurred by the system under attack.
Limited-Knowledge (LK) Gray-Box Attacks. One may con-
sider here different settings, depending on the attacker’s knowl-
edge about each of the components (k.i)-(k.iv). Typically, the
attacker is assumed to know the feature representation X and
the kind of learning algorithm f (e.g., the fact that the classi-
fier is linear, or it is a neural network with a given architec-
ture, etc.), but neither the training data D nor the classifier’s
(trained) parameters w. The attacker is however assumed to be
able to collect a surrogate data set Dˆ4 from a similar source
(ideally sampling from the same underlying data distribution),
and potentially get feedback from the classifier about its deci-
sions to provide labels for such data. This enables the attacker
to estimate the parameters wˆ from Dˆ, by training a surrogate
classifier. We refer to this case as LK attacks with Surrogate
Data (LK-SD), and denote it with θLK−SD = (Dˆ,X, f , wˆ) .
We refer to the setting in which the attacker does not even
know the kind of learning algorithm f as LK attacks with
Surrogate Learners (LK-SL), and denote it with θLK−SL =
(Dˆ,X, fˆ , wˆ). LK-SL attacks also include the case in which the
attacker knows the learning algorithm, but optimizing the at-
tack samples against it may be not tractable or too complex. In
this case, the attacker can also craft the attacks against a sur-
rogate classifier and test them against the targeted one. This is
a common procedure used also to evaluate the transferability
of attacks between learning algorithms, as firstly shown in [38]
and subsequently in [15] for deep networks.
Zero-Knowledge (ZK) Black-Box Attacks. Recent work has
also claimed that machine learning can be threatened without
any substantial knowledge of the feature space, the learning al-
gorithm and the training data, if the attacker can query the sys-
tem in a black-box manner and get feedback on the provided
labels or confidence scores [15, 66–69]. This point deserves
however some clarification. First, the attacker knows (as any
other potential user) that the classifier is designed to perform
some task (e.g., object recognition in images, malware classifi-
cation, etc.), and has to clearly have an idea of which potential
transformations to apply to cause some feature changes, other-
4We use here the hat symbol to denote limited knowledge of a given com-
ponent.
wise neither change can be inflicted to the output of the clas-
sification function, nor any useful information can be extracted
from it. For example, if one attacks a malware detector based on
dynamic analysis by injecting static code that will never be exe-
cuted, there will be no impact at all on the classifier’s decisions.
This means that, although the exact feature representation may
be not known to the attacker, at least she knows (or has to get to
know) which kind of features are used by the system (e.g., fea-
tures based on static or dynamic analysis in malware detection).
Thus, knowledge of the feature representation may be partial,
but not completely absent. This is even more evident for deep
networks trained on images, where the attacker knows that the
input features are the image pixels.
Similar considerations hold for knowledge of the training
data. If the attacker knows that the classifier is used for a spe-
cific task, it is clear the she also knows which kind of data has
been used to train it; for example, if a deep network aims to
discriminate among classes of animals, then it is clear that it
has been trained on images of such animals. Hence, also in this
case the attacker effectively has some knowledge of the training
data, even if not of the exact training samples.
We thus characterize this setting as θZK = (Dˆ, Xˆ, fˆ , wˆ).
Even if surrogate learners are not necessarily used here [66–
69], as well as in pioneering work on black-box attacks against
machine learning [20, 70], one may anyway learn a surro-
gate classifier (potentially on a different feature representa-
tion) and check whether the crafted attack samples transfer to
the targeted classifier. Feedback from classifier’s decisions on
carefully-crafted query samples can then be used to refine the
surrogate model, as in [15]. Although the problem of learn-
ing a surrogate model while minimizing the number of queries
can be casted as an active learning problem, to our knowledge
well-established active learning algorithms have not yet been
compared against such recently-proposed approaches [15].
3.3. Attacker’s Capability
This characteristic depends on the influence that the attacker
has on the input data, and on application-specific data manipu-
lation constraints.
Attack Influence. It can be causative, if the attacker can manip-
ulate both training and test data, or exploratory, if the attacker
can only manipulate test data. These scenarios are more com-
monly known as poisoning and evasion attacks [23, 26, 29, 31,
33, 38, 40–42, 61].
Data Manipulation Constraints. Another aspect related to the
attacker’s capability depends on the presence of application-
specific constraints on data manipulation, e.g., to evade mal-
ware detection, malicious code has to be modified without com-
promising its intrusive functionality. This may be done against
systems based on static code analysis, by injecting instructions
or code that will never be executed [11, 38, 39, 48]. These
constraints can be generally accounted for in the definition of
the optimal attack strategy by assuming that the initial attack
samplesDc can only be modified according to a space of possi-
ble modifications Φ(Dc). In some cases, this space can also be
mapped in terms of constraints on the feature values of the at-
tack samples; e.g., by imposing that feature values correspond-
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Figure 3: Security evaluation curves for two hypothetical classifiers C1 and C2,
inspired from the methodology proposed in [41, 42]. Based only on classifi-
cation accuracy in the absence of attack, one may prefer C2 to C1. Simulating
attacks of increasing strength (e.g., by increasing the level of perturbation in
input images) may however reveal that more accurate classifiers may be less
robust to adversarial perturbations. Thus, one may finally prefer C1 to C2.
ing to occurrences of some instructions in static malware detec-
tors can only be incremented [38, 39, 48].
3.4. Attack Strategy
Given the attacker’s knowledge θ ∈ Θ and a set of manip-
ulated attack samples D′c ∈ Φ(Dc), the attacker’s goal can be
defined in terms of an objective function A(D′c, θ) ∈ R which
measures how effective the attacks D′c are. The optimal attack
strategy can be thus given as:
D?c ∈ arg maxD′c∈Φ(Dc)
A(D′c, θ) (1)
We show in Sect. 4 how this high-level formulation encom-
passes both evasion and poisoning attacks against supervised
learning algorithms, despite it has been used also to attack clus-
tering [62–64], and feature selection algorithms [29, 65].
3.5. Security Evaluation Curves
It is worth remarking here that, to provide a thorough security
evaluation of learning algorithms, one should assess their per-
formance not only under different assumptions on the attacker’s
knowledge, but also increasing the attack strength, i.e., the at-
tacker’s capability Φ(Dc) of manipulating the input data. For
example, this can be done by increasing the amount of pertur-
bation used to craft evasion attacks, or the number of poison-
ing attack points injected into the training data. The resulting
security evaluation curve, conceptually represented in Fig. 3,
shows the extent to which the performance of a learning algo-
rithm drops more or less gracefully under attacks of increasing
strength. This is crucial to enable a fairer comparison among
different attack algorithms and defenses in the context of con-
crete application examples [41, 42], as we will discuss in the
remainder of this work.
3.6. Summary of Attacks against Machine Learning
Before delving into the details of specific attacks, we pro-
vide in Fig. 4 a simplified categorization of the main attacks
against machine-learning algorithms based on the aforemen-
tioned threat model; in particular, considering the attacker’s
Integrity Availability Privacy / Confidentiality
Test data Evasion (a.k.a. adversarial 
examples)
- Model extraction / stealing  
and model inversion (a.k.a. 
hill-climbing attacks)
Training data Poisoning (to allow subsequent 
intrusions) – e.g., backdoors or 
neural network trojans
Poisoning (to maximize 
classification error)
-
Misclassifications that do 
not compromise normal 
system operation
Misclassifications that 
compromise normal 
system operation
Attacker’s Goal
Attacker’s Capability
Querying strategies that reveal 
confidential information on the 
learning model or its users
Figure 4: Categorization of attacks against machine learning based on our threat
model.
goal and main capabilities. The most common attacks, as dis-
cussed before, include evasion and poisoning availability at-
tacks (aimed to maximize the test error) [23, 26, 29, 31, 33,
38, 40–42, 61]. More recently, different kinds of poisoning
integrity attacks (which manipulate the training data or the
trained model to cause specific misclassifications, as defined
in [29, 33]) against deep networks have been also studied un-
der the name of backdoor and trojaning attacks [71, 72]. These
attacks maliciously manipulate pre-trained network models to
create specific backdoor vulnerabilities. The corrupted mod-
els are then publicly released, to favor their adoption in pro-
prietary systems (e.g., via fine-tuning or other transfer learning
techniques). When this happens, the attacker can activate the
backdoors using specific input samples that are misclassified as
desired. The underlying idea behind such attacks and their im-
pact on the learning process is conceptually depicted in Fig. 5.
All the aforementioned attacks can be successfully staged under
different levels of the attacker’s knowledge. When knowledge is
limited, as in the gray-box and black-box cases, privacy or con-
fidential attacks can be staged to gain further knowledge about
the target classifier or its users. Although we do not thoroughly
cover such attacks in detail here, we refer the reader to few
practical examples of such attacks reported to date, including
model-extraction attacks aimed to steal machine-learning mod-
els, and model-inversion and hill-climbing attacks against bio-
metric systems used to steal the face and fingerprint templates
of their users (or any other sensitive information) [30, 66, 73–
76].
4. Be Proactive: Simulating Attacks
“To know your enemy, you must become your
enemy.”
(Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 500 BC)
We discuss here how to formalize test-time evasion and
training-time poisoning attacks in terms of the optimization
problem given in Eq. (1), and consistently with the threat model
discussed in Sect. 3. Note that other attacks may also be de-
scribed, generally, in terms of the aforementioned optimization
problem, but we focus here only on those for which this con-
nection is tighter.
4.1. Evasion attacks
Evasion attacks consist of manipulating input data to evade
a trained classifier at test time. These include, e.g., manipula-
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Backdoor / poisoning integrity attacks place mislabeled training points in a region of the 
feature space far from the rest of training data. The learning algorithm labels such 
region as desired, allowing for subsequent intrusions / misclassifications at test time
Training data (no poisoning)
61Figure 5: Conceptual representation of the impact of poisoning integrity attacks
(including backdoor and trojaning attacks) on the decision function of learning
algorithms. The example, taken from [71], shows a backdoored stop sign mis-
classified, as expected, as a speedlimit sign.
tion of malware code to have the corresponding sample mis-
classified as legitimate, or manipulation of images to mislead
object recognition. We consider here the formulation reported
in [7], which extends our previous work [38] from two-class to
multiclass classifiers, by introducing error-generic and error-
specific maximum-confidence evasion attacks. With reference
to Eq. (1), the evasion attack samplesD′c can be optimized one
at a time, independently, aiming to maximize the classifier’s
confidence associated to a wrong class. We will denote with
fi(x) the confidence score of the classifier on the sample x for
class i. These attacks can be optimized under different levels
of attacker’s knowledge through the use of surrogate classifiers,
so we omit the distinction between fi(x) and fˆi(x) below for
notational convenience.
Error-generic Evasion Attacks. In this case, the attacker is
interested in misleading classification, regardless of the output
class predicted by the classifier. The problem can be thus for-
mulated as:
max
x′
A(x′, θ) = Ω(x′) = max
l,k
fl(x) − fk(x) , (2)
s.t. d(x, x′) ≤ dmax , xlb  x′  xub , (3)
where fk(x) denotes the discriminant function associated to the
true class k of the source sample x, and maxl,k fl(x) is the clos-
est competing class (i.e., the one exhibiting the highest value
of the discriminant function among the remaining classes). The
underlying idea behind this attack formulation, similarly to [5],
is to ensure that the attack sample will be no longer classified
correctly as a sample of class k, but rather misclassified as a
sample of the closest candidate class. The manipulation con-
straints Φ(Dc) are given in terms of: (i) a distance constraint
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Figure 6: Examples of error-specific (left) and error-generic (right) evasion, as
reported n [7]. Decision boundaries among the three classes (blue, red and
green points) are shown as black lines. In the error-specific case, the initial
(blue) sample is shifted towards the green class (selected as target). In the
error-generic case, inst ad, it is shifted tow rds the red class, as it is the closest
class to the i itial sample. The gray circle represents the feasible domain, given
as an upper bound on the `2 distance between the initial and the manipulated
attack sample.
d(x, x′) ≤ dmax, which sets a bound on the maximum input per-
turbation between x (i.e., the input sample) and the correspond-
ing modified adversarial example x′; and (ii) a box constraint
xlb  x′  xub (where u  v means that each element of u has
to be not greater than the corresponding element in v), which
bounds the values of the attack sample x′.
For images, the former constraint is used to implement either
dense or sparse evasion attacks [7, 77, 78]. Normally, the `2 and
the `∞ distances between pixel values are used to cause an in-
distinguishable image blurring effect (by slightly manipulating
all pixels). Conversely, the `1 distance corresponds to a sparse
attack in which only few pixels are significantly manipulated,
yielding a salt-and-pepper noise effect on the image [77, 78].
In the image domain, the box constraint can be used to bound
each pixel value between 0 and 255, or to ensure manipulation
of only a specific region of the image. For example, if some
pixels should not be manipulated, one can set the correspond-
ing values of xlb and xub equal to those of x. This is of interest to
create real-world adversarial examples, as it avoids the manipu-
lation of background pixels which do not belong to the object of
interest [7, 17]. Similar constraints have been applied also for
evading learning-based malware detectors [38, 39, 48, 77, 78].
Error-specific Evasion Attacks. In the error-specific setting,
the attacker aims to mislead classification, but she requires the
adversarial examples to be misclassified as a specific class.
The problem is formulated similarly to error-generic evasion
(Eqs. 2-3), with the only differences that: (i) the objective func-
tion A(x′, θ) = −Ω(x′) has opposite sign; and (ii) fk denotes
the discriminant function associated to the targeted class, i.e.,
the class which the adversarial example should be (wrongly)
assigned to. The rationale in this case is to maximize the con-
fidence assigned to the wrong target class fk, while minimizing
the probability of correct classification [5, 7].
Attack Algorithm. The two evasion settings are conceptually
depicted in Fig. 6. Both can be solved through a straightforward
gradient-based attack, for differentiable learning algorithms (in-
cluding neural networks, SVMs with differentiable kernels,
etc.) [7, 38]. Non-differentiable learning algorithms, like deci-
sion trees and random forests, can be attacked with more com-
6
plex strategies [79] or using the same algorithm against a dif-
ferentiable surrogate learner [78].
4.1.1. Application Example
We report here an excerpt of the results from our recent
work [7], where we have constructed adversarial examples
aimed to fool the robot-vision system of the iCub humanoid.5
This system uses a deep network to compute a set of deep fea-
tures from input images (i.e., by extracting the output of the
penultimate layer of the network), and then learns a multiclass
classifier on this representation for recognizing 28 different ob-
jects, including cups, detergents, hair sprayers, etc. The results
for error-specific evasion (averaged on different target classes)
are reported in Fig. 7, along with some examples of perturbed
input images at different levels. We trained multiclass linear
SVMs (SVM), SVMs with the RBF kernel (SVM-RBF), and
also a simple defense mechanism against adversarial examples
based on rejecting samples that are sufficiently far (in deep
space) from known training instances (SVM-adv). This will
be discussed more in detail in Sect. 5.2.1 (see also Fig. 12 for
a conceptual representation of this defense mechanism). The
security evaluation curves in Fig. 7 show how classification ac-
curacy decreases against an increasing `2 maximum admissible
perturbation dmax. Notably, the rejection mechanism of SVM-
adv is only effective for low input perturbations (at the cost of
some additional misclassifications in the absence of attack). For
higher perturbation levels, the deep features of the manipulated
attacks become indistinguishable to those of the samples of the
targeted class, although the input image is still far from resem-
bling a different object. This phenomenon is connected to the
instability of the deep representation learned by the underlying
deep network. We refer the reader to [7] for further details, and
to [80] (and references therein) for the problem of generating
adversarial examples in the physical world.
4.1.2. Historical Remarks
We conclude this section with some historical remarks on
evasion attacks, with the goal of providing a better understand-
ing of the connections with recent work on adversarial exam-
ples and the security of deep learning.
Evasion attacks have a long tradition. As mentioned in
Sect. 1, back in 2004-2006, work in [20, 21, 34, 81] reported
preliminary attempts in evading statistical anti-spam filters and
malware detectors with ad-hoc evasion strategies. The very first
evasion attacks against linear classifiers were systematized in
the same period in [19–21], always considering spam filter-
ing as a running example. The underlying idea was to ma-
nipulate the content of spam emails by obfuscating bad words
and/or adding good words. To reduce the number of manipu-
lated words in each spam, and preserve message readability, the
idea was to modify first words which were assigned the highest
absolute weight values by the linear text classifier. Heuristic
countermeasures were also proposed before 2010 [35, 44, 82],
based on the intuition of learning linear classifiers with more
5http://www.icub.org
uniform feature weights, to require the attacker to modify more
words to get her spam misclassified. To summarize, the vul-
nerability of linear classifiers to evasion attacks was a known
problem even prior to 2010, and simple, heuristic countermea-
sures were already under development. Meanwhile, Barreno et
al. (see [23, 40] and references therein) were providing an ini-
tial overview of the vulnerabilities of machine learning from a
more general perspective, highlighting the need for adversar-
ial machine learning, i.e., to develop learning algorithms that
explicitly account for the presence of the attacker [61].
At that time, the idea that nonlinear classifiers could be more
robust than linear ones against evasion was also becoming pop-
ular. In 2013, Sˇrndic´ and Laskov [83] proposed a learning-
based PDF malware detector, and attacked it to test its vulnera-
bility to evasion. They reported that:
The most aggressive evasion strategy we could con-
ceive was successful for only 0.025% of malicious ex-
amples tested against a nonlinear SVM classifier with
the RBF kernel [...] we do not have a rigorous mathe-
matical explanation for such a surprising robustness.
Our intuition suggests that [...] the space of true fea-
tures is hidden behind a complex nonlinear transfor-
mation which is mathematically hard to invert. [...]
hence, the robustness of the RBF classifier must be
rooted in its nonlinear transformation.
Today we know that this hypothesis about the robustness of
nonlinear classifiers is wrong. The fact that a system could be
more secure against an attack not specifically targeted against it
does not provide any further meaningful information about its
security to more powerful worst-case attacks. Different systems
(and algorithms) should be tested under the same (worst-case)
assumptions on the underlying threat model. In particular, it is
not difficult to see that the attack developed in that work was
somehow crafted to evade linear classifiers, but not sufficiently
complex to fool nonlinear ones.
While reading that work, it was thus natural to ask ourselves:
“what if the attack is carefully-crafted against nonlinear clas-
sifiers, instead? How can we invert such complex nonlinear
transformation to understand which features are more relevant
to the classification of a sample, and change them?” The answer
was readily available: the gradient of the classification function
is exactly what specifies the direction of maximum variation
of the function with respect to the input features. Thus, we
decided to formulate the evasion of a nonlinear classifier simi-
larly to what we did in [82] for linear classifiers, in terms of an
optimization problem that minimizes the discriminant function
f (x) such that x is misclassified as legitimate with maximum
confidence, under a maximum amount of possible changes to
its feature vector.
In a subsequent paper [38], we implemented the aforemen-
tioned strategy and showed how to evade nonlinear SVMs and
neural networks through a straightforward gradient-descent at-
tack algorithm. In the same work, we also reported the first “ad-
versarial examples” on MNIST handwritten digit data against
nonlinear learning algorithms. We furthermore showed that,
when the attacker does not have perfect knowledge of the tar-
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Figure 7: Error-specific evasion results from [7]. Top row: Security evaluation curves reporting accuracy of the given classifiers against an increasing `2 input
perturbation. The right-hand side plots depict a laundry detergent misclassified as a cup when applying the minimum input perturbation required for misclassification,
along with the corresponding magnified noise mask. Bottom row: Images of the laundry detergent perturbed with an increasing level of noise. The manipulations
are only barely visible for perturbation values higher than 150-200 (recall however that these values depend on the image size, as the `2 distance).
geted classifier, a surrogate classifier can be learned on surro-
gate training data, and used to craft the attack samples which
then transfer with high probability to the targeted model. This
was also the first experiment showing that adversarial exam-
ples can be transferred, at least in a gray-box setting (training
the same algorithm on different data). Notably, Sˇrndic´ and
Laskov [39] subsequently exploited this attack to show that
PDF malware detectors based on nonlinear learning algorithms
were also vulnerable to evasion, conversely to what they sup-
posed in [83].
More recently, we have also exploited the theoretical findings
in [84], which connect regularization and robustness in kernel-
based classifiers, to provide a theoretically-sound countermea-
sure for linear classifiers against evasion attacks [48, 77]. These
recent developments have enabled a deeper understanding on
how to defend against evasion attacks in spam filtering and mal-
ware detection, also clarifying (in a formal manner) the intu-
itive idea of uniform feature weights only heuristically provided
in [44, 82]. In particular, we have recently shown how a proper,
theoretically-grounded regularization scheme can significantly
outperform heuristic approaches in these contexts [48, 77].
Security of Deep Learning. In 2014-2015, Szegedy et al. [2]
and subsequent work [3–5] showed that deep networks can
be fooled by well-crafted, minimally-perturbed input images
at test time, called adversarial examples. These samples are
obtained by minimizing the distance of the adversarial sam-
ple x′ to the corresponding source sample x under the con-
straint that the predicted label is different, i.e., minx′ d(x, x′)
s.t. f (x) , f (x′). Interestingly, the parallel discovery of such
gradient-based adversarial perturbations by Szegedy et al. [2]
and Biggio et al. [38] started from different premises, as also ex-
plained by Ian Goodfellow in one of his popular talks.6 While
6Available at: https://youtu.be/CIfsB_EYsVI?t=6m02s
we were investigating how to evade detection by learning al-
gorithms in security-related tasks with a clear adversarial na-
ture (like spam and malware detection) [38], Szegedy et al. [2]
were trying to interpret and visualize the salient characteristics
learned by deep networks. To this end, they started looking for
minimal changes to images in the input space that cause mis-
classifications. They expected to see significant changes to the
background of the image or to the structure and aspect of the
depicted objects, while it turned out that, quite surprisingly,
such modifications were almost imperceptible to the human
eye. This discovery has raised an enormous interest in both the
computer vision and security communities which, since then,
have started proposing novel security assessment methodolo-
gies, attacks and countermeasures to mitigate this threat, inde-
pendently re-discovering many other aspects and phenomena
that had been already known, to some extent, in the area of ad-
versarial machine learning. An example is given by the use of
surrogate classifiers with smoother decision functions [15] to
attack models that either mask gradients or are not end-to-end
differentiable [6]. One of such defense mechanisms, known as
distillation [6], has indeed shown to be vulnerable to attacks
based on surrogate classifiers [15], essentially leveraging the
idea behind limited-knowledge evasion attacks that we first dis-
cussed in [38]. Iterative attacks based on projected gradients
have also been independently re-discovered [104], despite they
had been used before against other classifiers [7, 38, 39].
Misconceptions on Evasion Attacks. The main misconcep-
tion that is worth highlighting here is that adversarial examples
should be minimally perturbed. The motivation of this miscon-
ception is easy to explain. The notion of adversarial examples
was initially introduced to analyze the instability of deep net-
works [2], i.e., their sensitivity to minimal input perturbations;
the goal of the initial work on adversarial examples was not to
to perform a detailed security assessment of a machine-learning
8
Adversarial ML
2004-2005: pioneering work
Dalvi et al., KDD 2004
Lowd & Meek, KDD 2005
2013: Srndic & Laskov, NDSS
2013: Biggio et al., ECML-PKDD - demonstrated vulnerability of nonlinear algorithms
to gradient-based evasion attacks, also under limited knowledge
Main contributions:
1. gradient-based adversarial perturbations (against SVMs and neural nets)
2. projected gradient descent / iterative attack (also on discrete features from malware data)
transfer attack with surrogate/substitute model
3. maximum-confidence evasion (rather than minimum-distance evasion) 
Main contributions:
- minimum-distance evasion of linear classifiers
- notion of adversary-aware classifiers
2006-2010: Barreno, Nelson, 
Rubinstein, Joseph, Tygar
The Security of Machine Learning
(and references therein)
Main contributions:
- first consolidated view of the adversarial ML problem
- attack taxonomy
- exemplary attacks against some learning algorithms
2014: Szegedy et al., ICLR
Independent discovery of (gradient-
based) minimum-distance adversarial 
examples against deep nets; earlier 
implementation of adversarial training 
Security of DNNs
2016: Papernot et al., IEEE S&P
Framework for security evalution of 
deep nets
2017: Papernot et al., ASIACCS
Black-box evasion attacks with 
substitute models (breaks distillation 
with transfer attacks on a smoother 
surrogate classifier)
2017: Carlini & Wagner, IEEE S&P
Breaks again distillation with 
maximum-confidence evasion attacks 
(rather than using minimum-distance 
adversarial examples)
2016: Papernot et al., Euro S&P
Distillation defense (gradient masking)
Main contributions:
- evasion of linear PDF malware detectors
- claims nonlinear classifiers can be more secure
2014: Biggio et al., IEEE TKDE Main contributions:
- framework for security evaluation of learning algorithms
- attacker’s model in terms of goal, knowledge, capability
2017: Demontis et al., IEEE TDSC
Yes, Machine Learning Can Be 
More Secure! A Case Study on 
Android Malware Detection
Main contributions:
- Secure SVM against adversarial examples in malware 
detection
2017: Grosse et al., ESORICS
Adversarial examples for
malware detection
2018: Madry et al., ICLR
Improves the basic iterative attack from 
Kurakin et al. by adding noise before 
running the attack; first successful use of 
adversarial training to generalize across 
many attack algorithms
2014: Srndic & Laskov, IEEE S&P
used Biggio et al.’s ECML-PKDD ‘13 gradient-based evasion attack to demonstrate 
vulnerability of nonlinear PDF malware detectors
2006: Globerson & Roweis, ICML
2009: Kolcz et al., CEAS
2010: Biggio et al., IJMLC
Main contributions:
- evasion attacks against linear classifiers in spam filtering
Work on security evaluation of learning algorithms
Work on evasion attacks  (a.k.a. adversarial examples)
Pioneering work on adversarial machine learning
... in malware detection (PDF / Android)
Legend
1
2
3
4
2
3
4
2015: Goodfellow et al., ICLR
Maximin formulation of adversarial 
training, with adversarial examples 
generated iteratively in the inner loop
2016: Kurakin et al.
Basic iterative attack with projected 
gradient to generate adversarial examples
2 iterative attacks
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algorithm using security evaluation curves (Fig. 7). Normally,
as already discussed in this paper and also in our previous
work [38, 41], for the purpose of thoroughly assessing the secu-
rity of a learning algorithm under attack, given a feasible space
of modifications to the input data, it is more reasonable to as-
sume that the attacker will aim to maximize the classifier’s con-
fidence on the desired output class, rather than only minimally
perturbing the attack samples (cf. Eqs. 2-3). For this reason,
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while minimally-perturbed adversarial examples can be used
to analyze the sensitivity of a learning algorithm, maximum-
confidence attacks are more suitable for a thorough security as-
sessment of learning algorithms under attack. In particular, the
use of the security evaluation curves described above gives us
a clearer understanding of the security of a learning algorithm
under more powerful attacks. By increasing the attack strength
(i.e., the maximum amount of perturbation applicable to the in-
put data), one can draw a complete security evaluation curve,
reporting the evasion rate for each value of attack strength. This
ensures us that, e.g., if the noise applied to the input data is
not larger than , then the classification performance should not
drop more than δ. Conversely, using minimally-perturbed ad-
versarial examples one can only provide guarantees against an
average level of perturbation (rather than a worst-case bound).
The fact that maximum- or high-confidence attacks are better
suited to the task of security evaluation of learning algorithms
(as well as to improve transferability across different models) is
also witnessed by the work by Carlini and Wagner [16, 85] and
follow-up work in [86, 87]. In that work, the authors exploited
a similar idea to show that several recent defenses proposed
against minimally-perturbed adversarial examples are vulner-
able to maximum-confidence ones, using a stronger attack sim-
ilar to those proposed in our earlier work, and discussed in
Sect. 4.1 [38, 41]. Even in the domain of malware detection,
adversarial examples seem to be a novel threat [11], while the
vulnerability of learning-based malware detectors to evasion is
clearly a consolidated issue [38, 39, 48]. Other interesting av-
enues to provide reliable guarantees on the security of neural
networks include formal verification [88] and evaluation meth-
ods inspired from software testing [89].
Timeline of Evasion Attacks. To summarize, while the secu-
rity of deep networks has received considerable attention from
different research communities only recently, it is worth re-
marking that several related problems and solutions had been
already considered prior to 2014 in the field of adversarial ma-
chine learning. Maximum-confidence evasion attacks and sur-
rogate models are just two examples of similar findings in both
areas of research. We compactly and conceptually highlight
these connections in the timeline reported in Fig. 8.7
4.2. Poisoning Attacks
Poisoning attacks aim to increase the number of misclassi-
fied samples at test time by injecting a small fraction of poison-
ing samples into the training data. These attacks, conversely to
evasion, are staged at the training phase. A conceptual exam-
ple of how poisoning works is given in Fig. 9. As for evasion
attacks, we discuss here error-generic and error-specific poison-
ing attacks in a PK white-box setting, given that the extension
to gray-box and black-box settings is trivial through the use of
surrogate learners [33].
7An online version of the timeline is also available at: https://sec-ml.
pluribus-one.it, along with a web application that allows one to generate
adversarial examples and evaluate if they are able to evade detection (evasion
attacks).
Error-Generic Poisoning Attacks. In this case, the attacker
aims to cause a denial of service, by inducing as many mis-
classifications as possible (regardless of the classes in which
they occur). Poisoning attacks are generally formulated as
bilevel optimization problems, in which the outer optimization
maximizes the attacker’s objective A (typically, a loss func-
tion L computed on untainted data), while the inner optimiza-
tion amounts to learning the classifier on the poisoned training
data [26, 29, 31]. This can be made explicit by rewriting Eq. (1)
as:
D?c ∈ arg maxD′c∈Φ(Dc)
A(D′c, θ) = L(Dval,w?) , (4)
s.t. w? ∈ arg min
w′∈W
L(Dtr ∪D′c,w′) , (5)
where Dtr and Dval are two data sets available to the attacker.
The former, along with the poisoning attack samplesD′c, is used
to train the learner on poisoned data, while the latter is used
to evaluate its performance on untainted data, through the loss
function L(Dval,w?). Notably, the objective function implic-
itly depends on D′c through the parameters w? of the poisoned
classifier.
Error-Specific Poisoning Attacks. In this setting the attacker
aims to cause specific misclassifications. While the problem
remains that given by Eqs. (4)-(5), the objective is redefined
as A(D′c, θ) = −L(D′val,w?). The set D′val contains the same
samples as Dval, but their labels are chosen by the attacker ac-
cording to the desired misclassifications. The objective L is
then taken with opposite sign as the attacker effectively aims to
minimize the loss on her desired labels [33].
Attack Algorithm. A common trick used to solve the given
bilevel optimization problems is to replace the inner optimiza-
tion by its equilibrium conditions [26, 29, 31, 33]. This en-
ables gradient computation in closed form and, thus, similarly
to the evasion case, the derivation of gradient-based attacks (al-
though gradient-based poisoning is much more computationally
demanding, as it requires retraining the classifier iteratively on
the modified attack samples). In the case of deep networks, this
approach is not practical due to computational complexity and
instability of the closed-form gradients. To tackle this issue,
we have recently proposed a more efficient technique, named
back-gradient poisoning. It relies on automatic differentiation
and on reversing the learning procedure to compute the gradient
of interest (see [33] for further details).
4.2.1. Application Example
We report here an exemplary poisoning attack against a
multiclass softmax classifier (logistic regression) trained on
MNIST handwritten digits belonging to class 0, 4, and 9.
We consider error-generic poisoning, using 200 (clean) train-
ing samples and 2000 validation and test samples. Results of
back-gradient poisoning compared to randomly-injected train-
ing points with wrong class labels (random label flips) are re-
ported in Fig. 10, along with some adversarial training exam-
ples generated by our back-gradient poisoning algorithm.
10
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Figure 9: Conceptual example of how poisoning attacks compromise a linear classifier [26, 29]. Each plot shows the training data (red and blue points) and the
corresponding trained classifier (black solid line). The fraction of poisoning points injected into the training set is reported on top of each plot, along with the
test error (in parentheses) of the poisoned classifier. Poisoning points are optimized through a gradient-based attack algorithm. They are initialized by cloning the
training points denoted with white crosses and flipping their label. The gradient trajectories (black dashed lines) are then followed up to some local optima to obtain
the final poisoning points (highlighted with black circles).
Figure 10: Security evaluation curve of a softmax classifier trained on the
MNIST digits 0, 4, and 9, against back-gradient poisoning and random label
flips (baseline comparison). Examples of adversarial training digits generated
by back-gradient poisoning are shown on the right.
4.2.2. Historical Remarks
To our knowledge, the earliest poisoning attacks date back
to 2006-2010 [23–25, 27, 90]. Newsome et al. [90] devised
an attack to mislead signature generation for malware detec-
tion; Nelson et al. [24] showed that spam filters can be com-
promised to misclassify legitimate email as spam, by learning
spam emails containing good words during training; and Ru-
binstein et al. [25] showed how to poison an anomaly detector
trained on network traffic through injection of chaff traffic. In
the meanwhile, exemplary attacks against learning-based cen-
troid anomaly detectors where also demonstrated [23, 27, 28].
Using a similar formalization, we have also recently showed
poisoning attacks against biometric systems [43]. This back-
ground paved the way to subsequent work that formalized poi-
soning attacks against more complex learning algorithms (in-
cluding SVMs, ridge regression, and LASSO) as bilevel op-
timization problems [26, 29, 31]. Recently, preliminary at-
tempts towards poisoning deep networks have also been re-
ported, showing the first adversarial training examples against
deep learners [32, 33].
It is worth finally remarking that poisoning attacks against
machine learning should not be considered an academic exer-
cise in vitro. Microsoft Tay, a chatbot designed to talk to young-
sters in Twitter, was shut down after only 16 hours, as it started
raising racist and offensive comments after being poisoned.8 Its
artificial intelligence was designed to mimic the behavior of
humans, but not to recognize potential misleading behaviors.
Kaspersky Lab, a leading antivirus company, has been accused
of poisoning competing antivirus products through the injec-
tion of false positive examples into VirusTotal,9 although it is
worth saying that they denied any wrongdoing, and blamed for
spreading false rumors. Another avenue for poisoning arises
from the fact that shared, big and open data sets are commonly
used to train machine-learning algorithms. The case of Ima-
geNet for object recognition is paradigmatic. In fact, people
typically reuse these large-scale deep networks as feature ex-
tractors inside their pattern recognition tools. Imagine what
may happen if someone could poison these data “reservoirs”:
many data-driven products and services could experience secu-
rity and privacy issues, economic losses, with legal and ethical
implications.
5. Protect Yourself: Security Measures for Learning Algo-
rithms
“What is the rule? The rule is protect yourself at all
times.”
(from the movie Million dollar baby, 2004)
In this section we discuss the third golden rule of the
security-by-design cycle for pattern classifiers, i.e., how to re-
act to past attacks and prevent future ones. We categorize the
corresponding defenses as depicted in Fig. 11.
5.1. Reactive Defenses
Reactive defenses aim to counter past attacks. In some ap-
plications, reactive strategies may be even more convenient
8https://www.wired.com/2017/02/keep-ai-turning-racist-monster
9http://virustotal.com
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Figure 11: Schematic categorization of the defense techniques discussed in Sect. 5.
and effective than pure proactive approaches aimed to solely
mitigate the risk of potential future attacks [30, 42, 91]. Re-
active approaches include: (i) timely detection of novel at-
tacks, (ii) frequent classifier retraining, and (iii) verification
of consistency of classifier decisions against training data and
ground-truth labels [42, 51]. In practice, to timely identify and
block novel security threats, one can leverage collaborative ap-
proaches and honeypots, i.e., online services purposely vulner-
able with the specific goal of collecting novel spam and mal-
ware samples. To correctly detect recently-reported attacks, the
classifier should be frequently retrained on newly-collected data
(including them), and novel features and attack detectors may
also be considered (see, e.g., the spam arms race discussed in
Sect. 2). This procedure should also be automated to some ex-
tent to act more readily when necessary; e.g., using automatic
drift detection techniques [12, 42, 92]. The correctness of clas-
sifier decisions should finally be verified by expert domains.
This raises the issue of how to involve humans in the loop in
a more coordinated manner, to supervise and verify the correct
functionality of learning systems.
5.2. Proactive Defenses
Proactive defenses aim to prevent future attacks. The main
ones proposed thus far can be categorized according to the
paradigms of security by design and security by obscurity, as
discussed in the following.
5.2.1. Security-by-Design Defenses against White-box Attacks
The paradigm of security by design advocates that a system
should be designed from the ground up to be secure. Based on
this idea, several learning algorithms have been adapted to ex-
plicitly take into account different kinds of adversarial data ma-
nipulation. These defenses are designed in a white-box setting
in which the attacker is assumed to have perfect knowledge of
the attacked system. There is thus no need to probe the targeted
classifier to improve knowledge about its behavior (as instead
done in gray-box and black-box attacks).
Countering Evasion Attacks. In 2004, Dalvi et al. [19] pro-
posed the first adversary-aware classifier against evasion at-
tacks, based on iteratively retraining the classifier on the sim-
ulated attacks. This is not very different from the idea of ad-
versarial training that has been recently used in deep networks
to counter adversarial examples [2, 3], or to harden decision
trees and random forests [79]. These defenses are however
heuristic, with no formal guarantees on convergence and robust-
ness properties. More theoretically-sound approaches relying
on game theory have been proposed to overcome these limita-
tions. Zero-sum games have been formulated to learn invari-
ant transformations like feature insertion, deletion and rescal-
ing [35–37].10 More rigorous approaches have then introduced
Nash and Stackelberg games for secure learning, deriving for-
mal conditions for existence and uniqueness of the game equi-
librium, under the assumption that each player knows every-
thing about the opponents and the game [46, 94]. Randomized
players [47] and uncertainty on the players’ strategies [95] have
also been considered to simulate less pessimistic scenarios. De-
spite these approaches seem promising, understanding the ex-
tent to which the resulting attack strategies are representative of
practical scenarios remains an open issue [96, 97]. Adversar-
ial learning is not a (board) game with well-defined rules and,
thus, the objective functions of real-world attackers may not
even correspond to those hypothesized in the aforementioned
games. It may be thus interesting to verify, reactively, whether
real-world attackers behave as hypothesized, and exploit feed-
back from the observed attacks to improve the definition of the
attack strategy. Another relevant problem of these approaches
is their scalability to large datasets and high-dimensional fea-
ture spaces, as it may be too computationally costly to generate
a sufficient number of attack samples to correctly represent their
distribution, i.e., to effectively tackle the curse of dimensional-
ity.
A more efficient approach relies on robust optimization. Ro-
bust optimization formulates adversarial learning as a mini-
max problem in which the inner problem maximizes the train-
ing loss by manipulating the training points under worst-case,
bounded perturbations, while the outer problem trains the learn-
ing algorithm to minimize the corresponding worst-case train-
ing loss [3, 84, 98, 104]. An interesting result by Xu et al. [84]
has shown that the inner problem can be solved in closed form,
at least for linear SVMs, yielding a standard regularized loss
formulation that penalizes the classifier parameters using the
dual norm of the input noise. This means that different reg-
ularizers amount to hypothesizing different kinds of bounded
worst-case noise on the input data. This has effectively estab-
lished an equivalence between regularized learning problems
and robust optimization, which has in turn enabled approximat-
ing computationally-demanding secure learning models (e.g.,
game-theoretical ones) with more efficient ones based on regu-
larizing the objective function in a specific manner [48, 77, 78],
10Note that similar ideas have been exploited also to model uncertainty on
some parameters of the data distribution and learn optimal robust classifiers
against worst-case changes of such parameters [93].
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Figure 12: Effect of class-enclosing defenses against blind-spot adversarial examples on multiclass SVMs with RBF kernels, adapted from [7]. Rejected samples
are highlighted with black contours. The adversarial example (black star) is misclassified only by the standard SVM (left plot), while SVM with rejection correctly
identifies it as an adversarial example (middle plot). Rejection thresholds can be modified to increase classifier security by tightening class enclosure (right plot), at
the expense of misclassifying more legitimate samples.
also in structured learning [99]. Notably, recent work has also
derived an extension of this formulation to nonlinear classi-
fiers [100]. The main effect of the aforementioned techniques
is to smooth out the decision function of the classifier, mak-
ing it less sensitive to worst-case input changes. This in turn
means reducing the norm of the input gradients. More direct
(and sometimes equivalent) approaches obtain the same effect
by penalizing the input gradients using specific regularization
terms [101–104].
Another line of defenses against evasion attacks is based on
detecting and rejecting samples which are sufficiently far from
the training data in feature space (similarly to the defense dis-
cussed in Sect. 4.1.1) [7, 8, 12, 105, 106]. These samples are
usually referred to as blind-spot evasion points, as they appear
in regions of the feature space scarcely populated by training
data. These regions can be assigned to any class during clas-
sifier training without any substantial increase in the training
loss. In practice, this is a simple consequence of the stationar-
ity assumption underlying many machine-learning algorithms
(according to which training and test data come from the same
distribution) [107, 108], and such rejection-based defenses sim-
ply aim to overcome this issue.
Finally, we point out that classifier ensembles have been also
exploited to improve security against evasion attempts (e.g.,
by implementing rejection-based mechanisms or secure fusion
rules) [44, 56, 82, 105, 109, 110] and even against poison-
ing attacks [111]. They may however worsen security if the
base classifiers are not properly combined [56, 105]. Many
other heuristic defense techniques have also been proposed;
e.g., training neural networks with bounded activation func-
tions and training data augmentation to improve stability to in-
put changes [112, 113].
Effect on Decision Boundaries. We aim to discuss here how
the proposed defenses substantially change the way classi-
fiers learn their decision boundaries. Notably, defenses in-
volving retraining on the attack samples and rejection mech-
anisms achieve security against evasion by essentially counter-
ing blind-spot attacks. One potential effect of this assumption
is that the resulting decision functions may tend to enclose the
(stationary) training classes more tightly. This in turn may re-
quire one to trade-off between the security against potential at-
tacks and the number of misclassified (stationary) samples at
test time, as empirically shown in Sect. 4.1.1, and conceptually
depicted in Fig. 12 [7]. The other relevant effect, especially
induced by regularization methods inspired from robust opti-
mization, is to provide a noise-specific margin between classes,
as conceptually represented in Fig. 13 [77, 78]. These are the
two main effects induced by the aforementioned secure learning
approaches in feature space.
It is finally worth remarking that, by using a secure learn-
ing algorithm, one can counter blind-spot evasion samples, but
definitely not adversarial examples whose feature vectors be-
come indistinguishable from those of training samples belong-
ing to different classes. In this case, indeed, any learning al-
gorithm would not be able to tell such samples apart [114].
The security properties of learning algorithms should be thus
considered independently from those exhibited by the chosen
feature representation. Security of features should be consid-
ered as an additional, important requirement; features should
not only be discriminant, but also robust to manipulation, to
avoid straightforward classifier evasion by mimicking the fea-
ture values exhibited by legitimate samples. In the case of deep
convolutional networks, most of the problems arise from the
fact that the learned mapping from input to deep space (i.e., the
feature representation) violates the smoothness assumption of
learning algorithms: samples that are close in input space may
be very far in deep space. In fact, as also reported in Sect. 4.1.1,
adversarial examples in deep space become indistinguishable
from training samples of other classes for sufficiently-high ad-
versarial input perturbations [7]. Therefore, this vulnerability
can only be patched by retraining or re-engineering the deeper
layers of the network (and not only the last ones) [2, 7].
Countering Poisoning Attacks. While most work focused on
countering evasion attacks at test time, some white-box de-
fenses have also been proposed against poisoning attacks [24,
25, 111, 115–119]. To compromise a learning algorithm dur-
ing training, an attack has to be exhibit different characteristics
from those shown by the rest of the training data (otherwise it
would have no impact at all) [111]. Poisoning attacks can be
thus regarded as outliers, and countered using data sanitization
(i.e., attack detection and removal) [111, 116, 118], and robust
learning (i.e., learning algorithms based on robust statistics that
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Figure 13: Decision functions for linear SVMs with `2, `∞ and `1 regularization on the feature weights [77, 78]. The feasible domain of adversarial modifications
(characterizing the equivalent robust optimization problem) is shown for some training points, respectively with `2, `1 and `∞ balls. Note how the shape of these
balls influences the orientation of the decision boundaries, i.e., how different regularizers optimally counter specific kinds of adversarial noise.
are intrinsically less sensitive to outlying training samples, e.g.,
via bounded losses or kernel functions) [25, 117, 119–122].
5.2.2. Security-by-Obscurity Defenses against Black-box At-
tacks
These proactive defenses, also known as disinformation tech-
niques in [23, 40, 61], follow the paradigm of security by ob-
scurity, i.e., they hide information to the attacker to improve
security. These defenses aim to counter gray-box and black-
box attacks in which probing mechanisms are used to improve
surrogate models or refine evasion attempts by querying the tar-
geted classifier.
Some examples include [51]: (i) randomizing collection of
training data (collect at different timings, and locations); (ii)
using difficult to reverse-engineer classifiers (e.g., classifier en-
sembles); (iii) denying access to the actual classifier or training
data; and (iv) randomizing the classifier’s output to give im-
perfect feedback to the attacker. The latter approach has been
firstly proposed in 2008 [45] as an effective way to hide in-
formation about the classification function to the attacker, with
recent follow-ups in [8, 47] to counter adversarial examples.
However, it is still an open issue to understand whether and to
which extent randomization may be used to make it harder for
the attacker to learn a proper surrogate model, and to implement
privacy-preserving mechanisms [123] against model inversion
and hill-climbing attacks [30, 66, 73–76].
Notably, security-by-obscurity defenses may not always be
helpful. Gradient masking has been proposed to hide the gra-
dient direction used to craft adversarial examples [6, 9], but
it has been shown that it can be easily circumvented with
surrogate learners [15, 16, 38], exploiting the same princi-
ple behind attacking non-differentiable classifiers (discussed in
Sect. 4.1) [78].
6. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented a thorough overview of work
related to the security of machine learning, pattern recognition,
and deep neural networks, with the goal of providing a clearer
historical picture along with useful guidelines on how to assess
and improve their security against adversarial attacks.
We conclude this work by discussing some future research
paths arising from the fact that machine learning has been orig-
inally developed for closed-world problems where the possible
“states of nature” and “actions” that a rationale agent can imple-
ment are perfectly known. Using the words of a famous speech
by Donald Rumsfeld, one could argue that machine learning
can deal with known unknowns.11 Unfortunately, adversarial
machine learning often deals with unknown unknowns. When
learning systems are deployed in adversarial environments in
the open world, they can misclassify (with high-confidence)
never-before-seen inputs that are largely different from known
training data. We know that unknown unknowns are the real
threat in many security problems (e.g., zero-day attacks in com-
puter security). Although they can be mitigated using the proac-
tive approach described in this work, they remain a primary
open issue for adversarial machine learning, as modeling at-
tacks relies on known unknowns, while unknown unknowns are
unpredictable.
We are firmly convinced that new research paths should be
explored to address this fundamental issue, complementary to
formal verification and certified defenses [88, 118]. Machine
learning algorithms should be able to detect unknown unknowns
using robust methods for anomaly or novelty detection, poten-
tially asking for human intervention when required. The de-
velopment of practical methods for explaining, visualizing and
interpreting the operation of machine-learning systems could
also help system designers to investigate the behavior of such
systems on cases that are not statistically represented by the
training data, and decide whether to trust their decisions on
such unknown unknowns or not. These future research paths
lie at the intersection of the field of adversarial machine learn-
ing and the emerging fields of robust artificial intelligence and
interpretability of machine learning [124, 125]. We believe that
these directions will help our society to get a more conscious
understanding of the potential and limits of modern data-driven
machine-learning technologies.
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